Demystifying Kubernetes RBAC and OIDC Auth

Kubernetes RBAC configuration can seem like a daunting task at first. In this article we will try to demystify some of the mechanism behind the authorisation process in Kubernetes and learn how to generate our own credentials to communicate with the Kubernetes API server.

We’ll also take a look at why you generally shouldn’t use the kubeconfig you initially get after creating a cluster, and how to configure OIDC authentication with the Kubernetes API server for use with kubectl.

Although the topic of Kubernetes authorisation is covered in-depth in the official documentation — and multiple articles and videos already exist on the topic, I’ve written this summary article as a way of better understanding Kubernetes, and hopefully helping others in doing the same.

RBAC Authorisation
#

Authorization in Kubernetes can be done through role-based access control (RBAC). Kubernetes also supports attribute-based access control (ABAC), and there exists a special-purpose node authorisation mode to authorise API requests made by kubelets. In this article we’ll only focus on RBAC authorisation.

For cluster-wide authorisation we can use non-namespaced ClusterRole resource — which defines PolicyRules for what the role allows, and ClusterRoleBindings — which links ClusterRoles to Subjects (users, groups, or service accounts), granting them access to specified Kubernetes resources.

More fine-grained authorisation can be obtained by using the namespaced Role and RoleBinding resources. Note that you can bind a ClusterRole to a RoleBinding to limit the scope of the ClusterRole to the namespace the RoleBinding exists in.

--- title: RBAC Authorization --- flowchart TB subgraph Role["Role"] name policy end subgraph RoleBinding["RoleBinding"] roleRef subjects end cert["Certificate"] token["Token"] roleRef --> name subjects --> cert subjects --> token

Kubernetes ships with some default ClusterRoles. These include the super-user cluster-admin ClusterRole, and the aptly named admin, edit and view ClusterRoles intended to be granted within namespaces using RoleBindings.

To have a request authorised, you have to present either a valid token or certificate recognised as a subject by a RoleBinding, which in turn references a Role describing what is allowed. There is also a special, hard-coded system:master Group that allows full access to the cluster without any associated ClusterRole or ClusterRoleBinding. This group is meant for break-glass access to a cluster, and should generally be avoided in favour of least-privilege access.

Kubernetes RBAC resources relationship. The RoleBindings connects subjects with Roles. (full size)

Kubeconfig
#

As a primer before we continue, we’ll quickly go through the kubeconfig-file used by kubectl to store access details to clusters.

Kubernetes follows the X.509 standard for certificates, and uses a public key infrastructure (PKI) for certificate distribution.

Given the sample kubeconfig file below, the certificate-authority field (line 8) contains a base64 encoded certificate meant to authenticate the API server we’re trying to communicate with. This helps mitigate man-in-the-middle attacks, making it harder to spoof the API server.

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apiVersion: v1
kind: Config

clusters:
  - name: kubernetes
    cluster:
      server: https://192.168.1.100:6443
      certificate-authority-data: <...>

users:
  - name: kubernetes-admin
    user:
      client-certificate-data: <...>
      client-key-data: <...>

contexts: {}

For authorising with the Kubernetes API server we can present a client-certificate (line 13) signed by the Kubernetes Certificate Authority (CA) and our private client-key (line 14) used to generate the certificate signing request. It’s also possible to use a token instead of a certificate, something we’ll look into later.

The context field (line 16) holds configuration used to communicate with the API server, i.e. a combination of user, cluster and optionally a namespace.

Whereas the CA and client certificates can be considered public, the client key should never be shared unless you want everyone to have access to your cluster. In lack of better judgement, I’ve added certificates and client keys for defunct clusters in the Summary section as examples.

Although certificate revocation is a well established part of PKI, Kubernetes does not (yet) support this feature. This means that any certificate signed by the Kubernetes CA is valid throughout its whole lifetime.

It’s possible to change the whole certificate chain instead, but I can only imagine it’s an arduous task filled with peril… and possibly a dragon or maybe a balrog. Kubeadm does have support for managing certificates, and there exist documentation on how to manually rotate the Kubernetes CA certificates, so it is possible.

Out-of-the-box Authorisation
#

Before we investigate how we can generate our own means of authorisation, let’s first look at what we get out-of-the-box from some common Kubernetes distributions.

The easiest starting point is Minikube, which is meant for local use. Looking at the kubeconfig generated by spinning up a Minikube-cluster, we see it referencing files for the certificate-authority, client-certificate and client-key fields.

Following the RSA algorithm, the client-key is just a collection of integers, including some really big ones that have special properties and are hard to both guess and compute — barring collapsing wave functions in future quantum computers, so we won’t pay it much mind.

If you’re interested in the RSA-key details you can check them using openssl by executing

openssl rsa -text -noout -in <key-file>

The more interesting part for our case are the certificates. These can be inspected by running

openssl x509 -text -noout -in <certificate-file>

Looking at the CA certificate, we see that it is self-signed — the Issuer and Subject fields reference the same Common Name (CN).

Certificate:
  Data:
    Issuer: CN=minikubeCA
    Subject: CN=minikubeCA
    X509v3 extensions:
      X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
        CA:TRUE
      X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: 
        61:34:D4:BB:7A:50:5C:59:BE:B7:12:AF:EB:86:6F:49:E5:7B:3C:02

Also note the Subject Key Identifier value.

Inspecting the client certificate reveals the CN of the certificate Issuer to be minikubeCA, we can also recognise the Subject Key Identifier from the CA certificate as the Authority Key Identifier, linking the two certificates. More interestingly, the subject Organisation (O) is the special system:masters group.

Certificate:
  Data:
    Issuer: CN=minikubeCA
    Subject: O=system:masters, CN=minikube-user
      X509v3 extensions:
        X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
        CA:FALSE
      X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: 
        61:34:D4:BB:7A:50:5C:59:BE:B7:12:AF:EB:86:6F:49:E5:7B:3C:02

Directly referencing the special system:masters group means that there is no way to rescind authorisation for this certificate since we can’t remove the group, nor revoke the certificate itself.

Kubeadm addressed the system:masters issue in version 1.28 onwards. Kubeadm now issues two kubeconfig-files upon cluster bootstrapping, a super-admin.conf file which is supposed to be kept for emergency purposes only — since it uses the system:masters group,

Certificate:
  Data:
    Issuer: CN=kubernetes
    Subject: O=system:masters, CN=kubernetes-super-admin

and another kubeconfig file — admin.conf,

Certificate:
  Data:
    Issuer: CN=kubernetes
    Subject: O=kubeadm:cluster-admins, CN=kubernetes-admin

which instead references the ClusterRoleBinding kubeadm:cluster-admins

We can inspect the kubeadm:cluster-admins CRB to see that it in turn references the default cluster-admin ClusterRole which gives full access to the cluster

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apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: ClusterRoleBinding
metadata:
  name: kubeadm:cluster-admins
subjects:
  - apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
    kind: Group
    name: kubeadm:cluster-admins
roleRef:
  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
  kind: ClusterRole
  name: cluster-admin

The difference between the kubeconfig-files is that if we suspect the admin.conf file to be compromised, we can delete the kubeadm:cluster-admins CRB, and the associated certificate loses its authorisation. Executing this proverbial footgun using the admin.conf credentials, we see that we lose access to the cluster

> kubectl delete clusterrolebinding kubeadm:cluster-admins
clusterrolebinding.rbac.authorization.k8s.io "kubeadm:cluster-admins" deleted
> kubectl get nodes
Error from server (Forbidden): nodes is forbidden: User "kubernetes-admin" cannot list resource "nodes" in API group "" at the cluster scope

Take note that if you switch to the super-admin.conf kubeconfig and re-create the CRB we just deleted, the admin.conf kubeconfig regains its privileges. Avoid restoring this CRB if you suspect that the admin.conf kubeconfig is compromised! Instead, conjure up a new Group subject and issue a new certificate as in the next section.

Out of the other Kubernetes distros I tried, Talos, AKS, and K3s all generated a system:masters level access certificate, except GKE which uses a plugin based on the client-go credential plugins framework for authorisation.

Custom Authorisation
#

For custom authorisation in Kubernetes, we can either take advantage of one of the default ClusterRoles — cluster-admin, admin, edit, view, or we can craft our own by stitching together appropriate rules.

It’s also possible to create aggregated cluster roles. Instead of directly defining policyRules, aggregated cluster roles defines an aggregationRule which combines the policyRules of ClusterRoles which matches the given criteria, this includes other aggregated cluster roles. As an example you can inspect the default admin, edit, and view ClusterRoles.

--- title: Simplified default aggregated ClusterRoles --- flowchart TB subgraph sys:view["system:aggregate-to-view"] sv["labels:\n aggregate-to-view"] end subgraph sys:edit["system:aggregate-to-edit"] se["labels:\n aggregate-to-edit"] end subgraph sys:admin["system:aggregate-to-admin"] sa["labels:\n aggregate-to-admin"] end subgraph view[view] var["aggregationRule:\n matchLabels:\n aggregate-to-view"] v["labels:\n aggregate-to-edit"] end subgraph edit[edit] ear["aggregationRule:\n matchLabels:\n aggregate-to-edit"] e["labels:\n aggregate-to-admin"] end subgraph admin[admin] aar["aggregationRule:\n matchLabels:\n aggregate-to-admin"] end sys:view --> view view --> edit sys:edit --> edit edit --> admin sys:admin --> admin style sv text-align: left, font-family: monospace style se text-align: left style sa text-align: left style v text-align: left style var text-align: left style e text-align: left style ear text-align: left style aar text-align: left

The aggregation mechanism comes in handy when you create custom resources where you might want cluster users to be able to view or create the resources. Assuming you’re already using the built-in roles for cluster users, you can simply define a new ClusterRole with the appropriate label which will then be aggregated to an applicable default ClusterRole.

As an example of creating and using our own ClusterRole, we will copy the details of the built-in cluster-admin — since it’s fairly straight-forward, ClusterRole and name it super-admin (line 4) to distinguish it

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apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: ClusterRole
metadata:
  name: super-admin
rules:
  - apiGroups: ['*']
    resources: ['*']
    verbs: ['*']
  - nonResourceURLs: ['*']
    verbs: ['*']

To actually use the ClusterRole we just created, we need to create a ClusterRoleBinding to link this role to a user, group, or service account.

Kubernetes assumes that a cluster-independent service manages normal users, and thus Kubernetes does not have any objects that represents normal user accounts.

Without any third party tool managing users, that means we’re free to make up users on a whim, which is what we’ll do here.

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apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: ClusterRoleBinding
metadata:
  name: super-admin
subjects:
  - kind: Group
    name: super-admin # Certificate O
    apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
  - kind: User
    name: lain # Certificate CN
    apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
  - kind: ServiceAccount
    name: sa-super-admin
    namespace: cluster-access
roleRef:
  kind: ClusterRole
  name: super-admin
  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io

The above CRB grants any subject recognised as belonging to the group super-admin (line 6-7), the specified user lain (line 9-10), and the sa-super-admin ServiceAccount in namespace cluster-access (line 12-13) the super-admin role (line 17-18) we created earlier.

Generating Certificates
#

Following PKI, we need to first create a private key before generating a CertificateSigningRequest (CSR). Diverging from the more common RSA cryptographic scheme, we can instead try out Elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC) which offers equivalent security with smaller keys compared to RSA, thus arguably being more efficient. We can generate a secp521r1 curve¹ EC-key using openssl by running

openssl ecparam -genkey -name secp521r1 -out private.key

To conjure up a user called alice belonging to thesuper-admin group we can create a certificate signing request signed by our freshly generated key — with organisation (O) super-admin and common name (CN) alice, by invoking

openssl req -new -key private.key -subj "/O=super-admin/CN=alice" -out alice.csr

Next we create a CertificateSigningRequest (CSR) resource with the alice.csr certificate signing request base64 encoded (line 6) to ask a Kubernetes signer (line 7) to sign the certificate for us

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apiVersion: certificates.k8s.io/v1
kind: CertificateSigningRequest
metadata:
  name: alice-csr
spec:
  request: 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
  signerName: kubernetes.io/kube-apiserver-client
  usages:
    - client auth

We also have to indicate that the certificate is to be used for authentication by adding client auth in the usages list (line 9).

After applying the above CSR to a cluster, we can see it pending approval

> kubectl get csr
NAME        AGE   SIGNERNAME                            REQUESTOR   REQUESTEDDURATION   CONDITION
alice-csr   26s   kubernetes.io/kube-apiserver-client   admin       <none>              Pending

Assuming we have the right privileges we can approve the request by running

kubectl certificate approve alice-csr

If everything went well, the signed certificate should now be in the satus field of the CSR resource. We can extract the signed certificate from the status field to alice.crt file by running

kubectl get csr alice-csr -o yaml | yq '.status.certificate' | base64 -d > alice.crt

Note the validity of the certificate

> openssl x509 -text -noout -in alice.crt
Certificate:
  Data:
    Validity
      Not Before: Nov 30 19:01:08 2024 GMT
      Not After : Nov 30 19:01:08 2025 GMT

Be sure to issue a new certificate before it expires if you wish to keep the access. If you want to revoke Alice’s access you have to delete either the ClusterRole or ClusterRoleBinding to rescind the authorisation vested in the certificate. Deleting the CR or CRB will naturally also revoke access to anyone else relying on them, so it might be a good idea to create a CRB for each cluster user.

With our private.key private key and alice.crt signed certificate in hand we can add them as credentials to our kubeconfig file by executing

kubectl config set-credentials alice --client-key=private.key --client-certificate=alice.crt --embed-certs=true

Next, create a new context that combines the newly created user credentials with the current cluster (you can find the cluster name by running kubectl config get-clusters)

kubectl config set-context alice --cluster=kubernetes --user=alice

To change to the new context run

kubectl config use-context alice

and verify that everything works by invoking

kubectl get pods -A

This last command should give an overview of all the pods running in the cluster if the certificate is valid and the private key is correct.

A simplified graph of the authorisation flow we just performed is summarised in the figure below

Creating a user certificate for the omnipotent Lain is left as an exercise to the reader.

ServiceAccounts
#

Every namespace in Kubernetes contains a ServiceAccount named default. This default ServiceAccount is only granted the default API discovery permission which all authenticated users get.

If we don’t manually assign a ServiceAccount to a Pod, that pod will get be assigned this default ServiceAccount.

A ServiceAccount can be used by Pods to communicate with the Kubernetes API server. Tools like Argo CD, Cilium and Cert manager extensively use the concepts in this article to communicate with the API server. If you run similar tools in your cluster I urge you to explore the ClusterRoles, ClusterRoleBindings, and ServiceAccounts these tools create when installed.

ServiceAccount Tokens
#

We can manually retrieve ServiceAccount tokens by either looking in /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount inside a Pod, or by using the TokenRequest API.

ServiceAccounts are primarily intended to be used by applications and services — i.e. non-human entities, although the documentation for the Kubernetes Dashboard links to a guide to create a sample user where they use a ServiceAccount, so we’ll allow ourselves to do the same for demonstrative purposes.

With the super-admin ClusterRoleBinding we created earlier, we can create the following ServiceAccount to bind to it (line 4)

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apiVersion: v1
kind: ServiceAccount
metadata:
  name: sa-super-admin
  namespace: cluster-access

To authenticate using the service account we can create a base 64 encoded JSON Web Token (JWT) by running

kubectl -n cluster-access create token sa-super-admin

We can inspect the generated JWT by pasting it into e.g. https://jwt.io

{
  "exp": 1733053970,
  "iat": 1733050370,
  "sub": "system:serviceaccount:cluster-access:sa-super-admin",
  ...
}

here we see that the token is valid for 3 600 seconds (exp - iat), or an hour.

The JWT can be used in a similar fashion as a certificate by adding it as a credential to a kubeconfig context

TOKEN=$(kubectl -n cluster-access create token sa-super-admin)
kubectl config set-credentials sa-super-admin --token=$TOKEN
kubectl config set-context sa-super-admin --cluster kubernetes --user sa-super-admin
kubectl config use-context sa-super-admin

If this is your only way of authenticating wth the cluster you’ll have to refresh the token every hour before it expires, or else you lose access.

OpenID Connect Authorisation
#

Rather than juggling long-lived certificates and abusing ServiceAccounts, we can instead use OpenID Connect (OIDC) for a more user-friendly way of authenticating to the Kubernetes API server.

Although OIDC authorisation is easier for the end-user, it requires some extra configuration from the cluster admin. We’ll need to set up an OIDC provider as well as configure the kube-apiserver to use said OIDC provider.

To avoid dealing with a client secret we’ll use the Proof Key for Code Exchange by OAuth Public Clients, or PKCE for short, pronounced pixy.

It’s possible to authenticate with the API server using vanilla kubectl, though using a plugin like kubelogin makes it a lot easier, and is what we’ll be using here.

Assuming you already know the client-id and URL-base of your OIDC provider discovery URL — e.g. <URL>/.well-known/openid-configuration, you can configure the kubelogin plugin by adding the following to your kubeconfig file

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users:
  - name: oidc
    user:
      exec:
        apiVersion: client.authentication.k8s.io/v1beta1
        command: kubectl
        args:
          - oidc-login
          - get-token
          - --oidc-issuer-url=<URL>
          - --oidc-client-id=kubectl
          - --oidc-extra-scope=profile,groups

Here <URL> on line 10 is the base of the discovery URL, and kubectl is the client ID (line 11). We also ask for the profile and groups scope which we can use to match with CRB subjects.

The next step is to configure an OIDC capable identity provider. There’s a plethora of self-hosted OIDC providers out there. Some examples are Authelia, Authentik, Kanidm, Keycloak, Rauthy, and Zitadel. I’m currently running both Authelia (with LLDAP for user management) and Keycloak (using the Crossplane Keycloak-provider for declarative setup), though I’m contemplating giving Kanidm a go. If you instead prefer an external service you can e.g. create a GitHub App, or use Google’s OpenID Connect solution.

I opted to use Authelia because of its inherent declarative config. Authelia was a bit finicky to set up as an OIDC provider at first — I’m working on an article on how to configure it, but once it’s working I added the following configuration

identity_providers:
  oidc:
    clients:
      - client_id: kubectl
        client_name: kubectl
        public: true
        redirect_uris: [ 'http://localhost:8000', 'http://localhost:18000' ]
        scopes: [ 'openid', 'groups', 'email', 'profile', 'offline_access' ]
        userinfo_signed_response_alg: 'none'

To enable OIDC integration in Kubernetes we need to pass the relevant arguments to kube-apiserver.

Using Minikube this can be done by starting it with the following parameters

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minikube start \
  --extra-config=apiserver.oidc-issuer-url=<URL> \
  --extra-config=apiserver.oidc-client-id=kubectl \
  --extra-config=apiserver.oidc-username-claim=sub \
  --extra-config=apiserver.oidc-username-prefix="oidc:" \
  --extra-config=apiserver.oidc-groups-claim=groups

Notice the OIDC-provider base <URL> on line 2 and client-id on line 3. We’ve also explicitly configured the oidc-username-claim (line 4) to be the JWT sub-claim. Other options for the username claim depends on your OIDC provider setup, some options can be either email, name, or preferred_username. The username-claim will be used to match User-kind subject in CRBs. To match Group-kind subjects we selected the aptly named groups-claim to select from (line 6).

The equivalent in Talos’ machineconfig would be

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cluster:
  apiServer:
    extraArgs:
      oidc-issuer-url: <URL>
      oidc-client-id: kubectl
      oidc-username-claim: sub
      oidc-username-prefix: "oidc:"
      oidc-groups-claim: groups

With Minikube started, the kubectl context should be automatically change to the system:masters context for the cluster. Using this context we can create the following CRB to match appropriate OIDC-claims

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apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: ClusterRoleBinding
metadata:
  name: oidc-admin
subjects:
  - kind: Group
    name: k8s:cluster-admin
    apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
  - kind: User
    name: oidc:lain
    apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
roleRef:
  kind: ClusterRole
  name: cluster-admin
  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io

Here we’ve chosen to match the k8s:cluster-admin (line 7) group from the groups-claim and the specific user with the sub-claim lain (line 10). To make it easy for ourselves we’ve used the built-in cluster-admin CR to grant full access to the cluster for subjects matching the given rules.

We can now create a new kubectl context using the oidc-user we manually created earlier and start using that context

kubectl config set-context oidc --cluster minikube --user oidc
kubectl config use-context oidc

When running a kubectl command that requires authentication, your web browser should pop up and greet you with the login page of your selected OIDC provider. After successfully logging in you should be greeted with a consent screen to hand over your details

Consenting to sharing your details, a Kubelogin view from localhost should appear informing you that you’ve successfully logged in to the cluster.

The JWT is cached in the ~/.kube/oidc-login/-folder if you want to inspect it. This token will be forwarded with each request to the API server.

Summary
#

Note that it is generally a very bad idea to share certificates and private keys as they can be used to wreak havoc. These have been generated inside a virtual machine that has now been decommissioned, so like a key to a burnt down house, they have no use except as examples.

I encourage you to inspect both certificates and keys using e.g. openssl.

Minikube
#

Public CA certificate

Client certificate signed by CA

Private key

K3s
#

Public CA certificate

Client certificate signed by CA

Private key

Kubeadm
#

Public CA certificate

Super admin certificate signed by CA

Private key for super-admin certificate

Admin certificate signed by CA

Private key for admin certificate

kubeadm:cluster-admins ClusterRoleBinding

apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: ClusterRoleBinding
metadata:
  name: kubeadm:cluster-admins
subjects:
  - apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
    kind: Group
    name: kubeadm:cluster-admins
roleRef:
  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
  kind: ClusterRole
  name: cluster-admin

I think this curve is overkill, and I’m open to suggestions on better cryptographic curves! ↩︎

RBAC Authorisation#

Kubeconfig#

Out-of-the-box Authorisation#

Custom Authorisation#

Generating Certificates#

ServiceAccounts#

ServiceAccount Tokens#

OpenID Connect Authorisation#

Summary#

Minikube#

K3s#

Kubeadm#

RBAC Authorisation
#

Kubeconfig
#

Out-of-the-box Authorisation
#

Custom Authorisation
#

Generating Certificates
#

ServiceAccounts
#

ServiceAccount Tokens
#

OpenID Connect Authorisation
#

Summary
#

Minikube
#

K3s
#

Kubeadm
#